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"DUEL" DILIGENCE: SECOND
THOUGHTS ABOUT THE SUPREMES
AS THE SULTANS OF SWING
PAUL

H.

EDELMAN* & JIM CHEN**

ABsTracr: We respond to Professor Lynn A. Baker's criticisms of

our article,The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Mathematics. Professor Baker fundamentally misunderstands our measure of Supreme Court voting power. Moreover,she
erroneouslypresumes that the "medianJustice" wields the bulk of the
Court's power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from
clear whether he would be the Most DangerousJustice. We conclude

with a clarificationof the median voter theorem and its implications
for the distribution of voting power within the Supreme Court.

I. EN GARDE
Joining issue is indeed "the sincerest form of flattery," 1 and we
are pleased that Professor Lynn A. Baker has taken the trouble to
study and respond to our Article, The Most Dangerous Justice: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics.' We suspect, however, that

Professor Baker comes to bury our "intimidatingly complex mathematical methods," 3 not to praise them. Conjecturing that "something
is amiss in the logic or mechanics" of our analysis, Professor Baker
argues that our "elaborate mathematics [are] both unnecessary to the
project and explicitly based on assumptions that are inappropriate to
the question [we] claim to seek to answer."'
Professor of Mathematics, University of Minnesota <edehnan@math.umn.edu>.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota <chenxO64@maroon.tc.unn.edu>.
Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry supplied helpful suggestions.
1. Lynn A. Baker, InterdisciplinaryDue Diligence: The Case for Common Sense in the
Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 187, 187 n.* (1996).
2. Paul H. Edehman & Jim Chen, The Most DangerousJustice: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Mathematics, 70 S.CAT L. REv. 63 (1996).
3. Baker, supra note 1, at 190.
4. Cf.WmrTAM SHArsPEAPE, JuLrus CxsAR, act 3, sc. 2, 1. 78 (Lawrence Mason ed.,
1959) [hereinafter Juuus C sAR] ("I come to bury Csar, not to praise him.").
5. Baker, supra note 1, at 190.
*

**
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Tempted though we are to say "Professor Baker is a dreamer; let
us leave [her]: pass," 6 we will defend our model of Supreme Court
voting power against the charge that it is "seriously flawed."17 In particular, we can and will justify our choice to focus on feasible fiveJustice coalitions. Her misreading of our Article undermines another
of her criticisms, that we rely unduly on the Justices' past votes in
order to predict their future behavior. Finally, Professor Baker fails
to distinguish the most powerful Justice from the median Justice. Her
implicit decision to equate the two concepts belies her reliance on a
simplistic public choice model that is wholly unsuited for serious analysis of Supreme Court voting.
At the end of her paper, Professor Baker proposes her own measures of Supreme Court power. We will discuss what she is measuring
and, more importantly, what she is not. At heart Professor Baker
seeks to find the Court's median Justice, a quest that we forswore in
The Most Dangerous Justice.8 We now take up Professor Baker's
gauntlet. A variant of the generalized Banzhaf index that we developed in The Most DangerousJustice more accurately determines the

Court's median voter. This modified index offers strong, almost startling, empirical support for our own theory on the implications of the
median voter theorem for the distribution of power on the Supreme
Court.
II. PARRY
Professor Baker argues that our model is "full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing" 9 because we (1) assign undue-indeed, exclusive-weight to five-Justice coalitions,10 (2) analyze "feasible coalitions" rather than "all actual coalitions" or "all theoretically possible
coalitions,"'" and (3) rely on the Justices' past performance to predict
their future voting and coalition-building patterns.'2 We will refute
each alleged flaw in turn. In the end, Professor Baker's rebukes
6. Juurus CxSAR, supra note 4, act 1, sc. 2, 1.27.
7. Baker, supra note 1, at 193.
8. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 97.
9.

Baker, supra note 1, at 192 (quoting WnuA

(Eugene M. Waith ed. 1954) [hereinafter MAcBET-]).
10. See Baker, supra note 1, at 193-96.
11. See idU at 196-98.
12. See id. at 198-200.

SrHjAKEsPEARE, MACBETH, act 5, sc. 5
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merely befuddle us without shaking our confidence in our model;
"[t]he attempt and not the deed / Confounds us."13
A.

"EDELMAN AND CHEN...

CONSIDER ONLY FIVE-JUSTICE
14

COALrrIONS"'

Professor Baker criticizes us for focusing on five-Justice blocs to
the exclusion of larger coalitions. She asserts that a Justice's voting
power is as evident in larger coalitions as in smaller ones.1 5 For the
moment we shall leave aside her decision to identify the median Justice as the most powerful Justice. For now we will weigh her objection
in light of the following hypothetical.
Suppose that the fictional Justice Milquetoast decides that he will
always vote in the majority. If necessary, Justice Milquetoast would
pass his turn during the Conference of the Justices and withhold his
views from his colleagues until a decisive consensus emerges. (Any
resemblance to a former Chief Justice of the United States is strictly
coincidental and certainly unintentional.) By virtue of this voting
strategy, Justice Milquetoast would vote with the winning side in every
case before the Court. Professor Baker evidently would rate Justice
Milquetoast the most powerful Justice. But Justice Milquetoast will
have no influence on any outcome in any case decided by a coalition
numbering more than five. Once five other Justices have come to an
agreement, Justice Milquetoast will automatically join them. He can
influence the actual outcome of a case in exactly one situation: breaking a 4-4 tie among the other Justices. Justice Milquetoast's vote
would then create a decisive five-Justice coalition, which conveniently
happens to be the very type of coalition we analyze. Given a reasonably realistic set of votes from a hypothetical Supreme Court Term,
we could compute Justice Milquetoast's actual power. One thing,
however, should be amply clear. Professor Baker's suggestions
notwithstanding, the habit of voting with the majority does not, standing alone, determine a Justice's influence.
At bottom, Professor Baker's model assigns inordinate power to
a Justice who invariably votes with the majority. The historical examples of William Johnson, John Marshall Harlan, and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., show that some degree of deviation from the Court's
13. MAcBETH, supra note 9, act 2, se. 1.
14. Baker, supra note 1, at 193.

15. See id. at 195.
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center of gravity can be an essential element of judicial influence. 6 If
anything, a mind-numbing tendency to agree with everything the
Court does is a hallmark of insipid, vapid jurisprudence. 17 Under
these circumstances, to characterize the median Justice as holding the
balance of power on the Supreme Court is a call to armed rebellion:
Ye gods, it doth amaze me,
A man of such a feeble temper should
world,
So get the start of the majestic
18
And bear the palm alone.
Perhaps Professor Baker's misunderstanding of our model stems
from our initial, admittedly naYve use of 5-4 decisions to quantify the
relative strengths of the Justices' votes. 19 But we never restrict ourselves to 5-4 decisions. Indeed, to do so would be completely contrary
16.

See, eg., FELix FRANKFURTER, MR. JuSTIcE BRANDEIs 80 (1932) (characterizing Jus-

tice Holmes as a dissenter from the substantive due process jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
during the early twentieth century); FRnN B. LATHAM, Trm GRFAT DISSENTER, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN, 1833-1911 (1970); DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON: Tim
FmsT DIssENMR (1954).

17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most InsignicantJustice: FurtherEvidence, 50 U. Cm.
L. REv, 481, 491 (1983) (using the number of dissents by a Justice as a negative indicator of
judicial "insignificance"); cf David P. Currie, The Most InsignificantJustice:A PreliminaryInquiry, 50 U. C. L. REv. 466, 474, 475 n.60 (1983) (describing other "sure-fire indicators of an
inferior mind"). But see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176-77 n.10
(1980) ("The comments in the dissenting opinion about the proper cases for which to look for
the correct statement of the equal protection rational-basis standard, and about which cases limit
earlier cases, are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion."). See generally Thomas G.
Walker, Lee Epstein & William J. Dixon, On the Mysterious Demise of ConsensualNorms in the
United States Supreme Court, 50 J. PoL 361 (1988).
18. Ju-rus CxsAR, supra note 4, act 1, sc. 2. Any resemblance between Julius Cmsar and
any sitting Supreme Court Justice is, once again, strictly coincidental and certainly unintentional.
19. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 68-73. Professor Baker's misunderstanding may
be even more fundamental. She evidently follows different criteria for identifying five-Justice
coalitions. In her list of "five-Justice winning coalitions" for the 1994 Term, see Baker, supra
note 1, at 213 (Appendix A), she includes one case that we exclude. Exactly one paragraph of
United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995), can be read as the product of a five-Justice
coalition. We accordingly excluded this case from our tabulations. See Edelman & Chen, supra
note 2, at 70-71 (Table 2.1.1). We harbor far deeper disagreements with Professor Baker's list of
five-Justice coalitions for the 1995 Term. CompareBaker, supranote 1, at 216-17 (Appendix B)
with Edelman & Chen, supranote 2, at 71 (Table 2.1.2). We omit five cases that she includes in
her list of 5-4 decisions for the 1995 Term. Almost all of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Koon v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996), garnered the unanimous support of the Court. Although
only four other Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomasjoined his entire opinion, at no proint did the opinion of the Court lack the support of more than
three Justices. See id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joining all
but part IV-B-1 of the majority opinion); id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Ginsburg, J.) (joining all but part IV-B-3 of the majority opinion); id. at 2056 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (joining all but part IV-B-3
of the majority opinion). Four decisions within Professor Baker's list of "five-Justice coalitions"
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to our model. The data set underlying our more sophisticated index
consists of an entire Supreme Court Term, ranging from 5-4 decisions
to unanimous decisions. After collecting all actual coalitions that
form during any particular Supreme Court Term (or Terms), we construct an additional set of feasible coalitions derived from the intersections of the actual coalitions. October Term 1994 generated only
eleven actual five-Justice coalitions. Our power ratings for that Term,
however, were based on a total of seventy-one five-Justice coalitions.
The additional coalitions were imputed from the intersections of
larger actual coalitions as described in the paper. Thus, the information about coalitions larger than five Justices is included in the model,
although perhaps not as obviously as Professor Baker might like.
For example, consider how the intersection of two distinct sevenJustice coalitions might yield a feasible five-Justice coalition that did
not actually appear during the Term. In the 1994 Term, the coalition
consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer prevailed in United States v.
Mezzanatto.20 A different coalition, that of Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, emerged
in Garlotte v. Fordice.21 The feasible coalition that is imputed from
the intersection of these actual coalitions consists of Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The two 7-2 decisions that did take place thus contributed to our final measure of voting power for that Term. (Note the presence of all four of the 1994
Term's power pageant finalists in the imputed five-Justice coalition.)
Two six-Justice coalitions from the 1994 Term allow us to illustrate our method in an even more striking way. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
coalesced long enough to decide a substantial portion of Witte v.
for the 1995 Term-Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996); Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S.
Ct. 2013 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186
(1996)-suffer from the opposite problem. By our count, none of these four cases produced
more than a four-Justice coalition for any particular set of legal propositions. See Edelman &
Chen, supra note 2, at 92 & nn.120-21. Professor Baker's inclusion of these four cases is all the
more puzzling in light of her decision to describe Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Ina v. FCC,116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) as a "four-Justice winning coalition[]" and Colorado Republic Campaign Committee v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) as as "three-Justice winning
coalition[]." Baker, supranote 1, at 217. We do not understand how she could correctly exclude
the first amendment cases out of Colorado from her tally of 5-4 cases, yet treat every other
nonmajority decision from the 1995 Term as though it generated an opinion attracting exactly
five Justices.
20. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995) (Thomas, J.).
21. 115 S. Ct. 1948 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.).

224
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United States." A second six-Justice coalition, consisting of Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, decided
three cases during that Term. 23 The five-Justice coalition that we derived from the intersection of these six-Justice coalitions never actually emerged during the 1994 Term. The feasibility of this coalitionnamely, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerbecame fully apparent in the 1995 Term, when it delivered the crucial
24
five votes that decided Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
In a vivid though anecdotal way, the Gasperini example illustrates the effectiveness of our method for identifying feasible coalitions among the Justices. We will now defend that method in a more
systematic fashion.
B. Tm FEASIILITY

FRENZY

In The Most Dangerous Justice, we explained our methodology
for constructing feasible coalitions and for computing a voting power
index based on those feasible coalitions.' Professor Baker attacks
our technique root and branch. "[W]hy are the intersections of actually occurring winning coalitions relevant to the search for the median
Justice?" she asks. "Why don't Edelman and Chen simply consider all
26
possible coalitions to constitute the set of 'feasible coalitions'?1
That would certainly be a "simple" way to proceed, but (in the words
'2 7
of our esteemed former President) "it would be wrong.
The foundation of Professor Baker's objection, of course, is not
the number of coalitions taken into account, but the use of intersections per se. Let us begin our defense by identifying points on which
we and Professor Baker agree. We took as our first premise the proposition that there are some alliances on the Supreme Court that will
never form.2 Professor Baker apparently accepts this supposition.29
22. 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995) (O'Connor, J.).
23. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct.
2407 (1995) (Stevens, J.); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (Stevens,
J.); O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995) (Breyer, J.).
24. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.).
25. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 81-83; see also id. at 83 (explaining how a credible threat of defection affects a Justice's voting power).
26. Baker, supra note 1, at 196 (emphasis in original). Note again that Professor Baker
equates the median Justice with the Most Dangerous Justice.
27. Thomas D. Elias, Nixon Library Set to Open July 19, S.F. EXAMRNER, July 1, 1990, at E6
(quoting President Nixon's Watergate tapes: "We could do it, but it would be wrong."). See
generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
28. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 67.
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Or does she? Professor Baker's suggestion that we "consider all
possible coalitions to constitute the set of 'feasible coalitions' effectively presumes that all possible coalitions among Justices are plausi-

ble and equally likely to form. To ignore ideological incompatibility
among certain Justices, as Professor Baker implicitly does, is to trivialize the entire exercise of computing the Justices' voting power. Unless
we accept the premise that ideological divisions within the Court impose absolutely no limits on the plausible range of alliances among the
Justices, we must use some method for distinguishing between feasible
and implausible coalitions. Intersections among actually observed coalitions are one such method. Although we admit that intersections of
actually observed coalitions are an awkward and at best indirect mea-

sure of ideological constraints on Supreme Court decisionmaking,
they are (at least in the short run) necessary. In any given Term, the
Court will have fewer than 100 opportunities to reveal what we call its
coalitional deep structure-namely, unstated but immovable ideological limits on the Justices' ability to form coalitions.
It may well be that a larger number of cases decided by a single
Court would obviate the need to rely on a mathematical surrogate for
the Justices' coalition-building propensities. Our data from the 1994
and 1995 Terms provide some support for this view. There is greater
convergence between the naive power index based solely on 5-4 decisions from these two Terms and the sophisticated power index for that
time period than there is between the naive index for either Term
standing alone and the sophisticated index for that Term. The mean
square error between the naive index and our generalized Banzhaf
index for the 1994 Term, the 1995 Term, and the union of both Terms
shows how the naive index approaches the sophisticated index as the
number of actual cases increases:
TABLE 2.1: MEAN SQUARE ERROR BETWEEN THE NAIVE
AND GENERALIZED BANZHAF INDEXES OF
SUPREME COURT VOTING POWER
1994 Term:
1995 Term:
1994 and 1995 Terms:

.006649
.008112
.002356

29. See Baker, supra note 1, at 199 ("Even casual Court watchers would surely contend, for
example, that Justice Scalia is likely to agree with Justice Thomas much more often than with
Justice Ginsburg over the course of any one Term.").
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Of course, waiting on the Court carries its own hazards. The
jurisprudence of individual Justices does evolve over time. No one,
for example, would equate the Harry Blackmun of October Term 1971
with the Harry Blackmun of October Term 1993.1 o Moreover, the
Court's personnel is in constant flux. The haphazard removal and
addition of Justices turns the art of predicting Supreme Court
coalitions into a most treacherous game of chance. We may either
wait, perhaps bootlessly, for one group of Supreme Court Justices to
accumulate a workable record of decisions, or we may proceed with
an imperfect but mathematically cogent measure of the Court's voting
power.
For the time being, then, intersections of observed Supreme
Court coalitions remain necessary, and we adhere to a methodology
that relies on such intersections. This brings us to Professor Baker's
second objection. She complains that "it is not clear why one should
be concerned with whether '[t]he [four-Justice] coalition obtained by
removing [a particular] Justice [from a given five-Justice feasible
coalition] is a feasible coalition as well."' 31 This technique, she writes,
is "both unnecessary and destined to yield meaningless results.1 32
According to her, this strict definition of feasibility is unnecessary
"because the stated task is to identify the median or most powerful
Justice over the course of a particular Term, not the 'swing' Justice of
a single decision of the Court. '33
Once again Professor Baker misreads our project. We do not
wish to discover the median Justice; rather, we are trying to identify
the Most Powerful Justice by computing the likelihood that a
particular Justice will cast the decisive vote over a broad spectrum of
Supreme Court controversies. Whether our index is "destined to yield
meaningless results" is a question we will leave to critics who actually
understand our methodology.
30. Compare, e-g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional
action in considering [the death penalty], or our distaste for [it], to guide our judicial decision in
[capital] cases ....) with, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) ("Experience has taught us that the constitutional goal of
eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death can never be
achieved without compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairnessindividualized sentencing." (citation omitted)).
31. Baker, supra note 1, at 197 (quoting Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 83 (alterations
in original)).
32. Id.
33. ld.
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The difference between a median Justice and a swing Justice,
especially on a Supreme Court that is fractured along numerous
ideological fault lines, is the swing Justice's marginal propensity to
defect from one winning coalition to another. A powerful Justice
captures the subtle balance between being in the majority often and
being sufficiently independent that the threat to defect is realistic and
will therefore have some power to sway the decision. In other words,
the difference between our view and Professor Baker's is the familiar
difference between the dynamic and the static. Professor Baker asks
how often a Justice appears in the fifth slot out of nine. By contrast,
we measure a Justice's power by her ability and her inclination to
move the Court toward her view of the law. Flexibility, not frequency,
is the ultimate touchstone of power.
C. "TIM

PRESENT AND TimE PAST...

"...Are both perhaps present in time future, / And time future

contained in time past."34 We are frankly baffled by Professor Baker's
final attack on our analysis. Supposedly our model rests on the assumption that "[p]redicting the [f]uture [i]s the [s]ame as [e]xamining
the [p]ast." 35 To the charge that we use "complete information about
the coalitions that formed during a particular past Term of the
Supreme Court" in order "to predict that the [most powerful] Justice
during some future Term will be the same," we plead guilty. Had we
no interest in the Supreme Court's future behavior, we would be hard
pressed to justify the time spent dissecting two Terms' worth of
Supreme Court decisions. Fortunately, American law and legal institutions value the technique of using historical information to forecast
the future.36 If the use of past information to predict future behavior
were altogether invalid, investment advisers and securities regulators
would be wasting their time. Insurance would be meaningless. We
have conducted "an experiment, as all life is an experiment." 37 Except perhaps in the Never-Never-Land of cooperative game theory, all
34.

T.S. ELiOT, Burnt Norton, 1. 2-3, in Four QuARTETS 3, 3 (1943).

35. Baker, supra note 1, at 198.
36. See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.) ("a page
of history is worth a volume of logic"); OIVER WENDELL Ho.MES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1

(1902) ("The life of the law has not been logic- it has been experience."); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897) (defining law as "what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious").
37. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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of us routinely "wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge." 38
If Professor Baker simply complained that our index has limited
predictive value, we might gladly concede the impact of her criticism.
As a Danish courtesan reputedly said during a fencing match, "A hit,
a very palpable hit."'39 The power pageant of the Justices would be a
frivolous parlor game for Supreme Court watchers, and no more. But
something is rotten in the state of game theory.40 Describing the
Supreme Court as a primitive "nine-member decisionmaking body operating under 'one member, one vote' and a simple majority decision
rule," Professor Baker asserts that the Court offers "little to interest
the student of voting systems."'" It is hard to imagine a more explicit
repudiation of our entire project.
In a moment of supreme irony, Professor Baker points to the
alignment of Justices in Romer v. Evans42 as evidence that her approach to Supreme Court power is superior to ours.43 The happy coincidence that the six-Justice coalition in Romer included the most
popular nominees for the Most Powerful Justice-Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg-is beside the point. So is Professor Baker's
presumption that we "would have advised the attorneys in Romer to
focus their arguments... on Justice[s] Ginsburg... and Kennedy."a4
Either Professor Baker believes in using past cases to predict future
vote alignments, or she doesn't. Nor does Professoi Baker materially
advance her cause by equating her analysis with Laurence Tribe's apparent litigation methodology,45 which failed to garner five votes in
Bowers v. Hardwick,46 a hotly contested antecedent of Romer. Alas,

38. Id.
39. WiULAhm SHAxEsPEARE, HAMLET, act 5, sc. 2, 1.285 (Tucker Brooke & Jack Randall
Crawford eds., 1947).
40. Cf id., act 1, sc. 4, 1.90 ("Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.").
41. Baker, supra note 1, at 200; see also id. ("[A]ficianados of the Shapley-Shubik and
Banzhaf indexes have shown little interest in studying the Supreme Court.").
42. 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg &
Breyer, JJ.).
43. See Baker, supra note 1, at 207.
44. Id. at 208 n.90. Far be it from us to give anyone legal advice. Neither of us is or ever
expects to be an active member of the bar in any jurisdiction.
45. See id. at 208 & n.93.
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (5-4 decision).
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like others who rest too much of their legal scholarship on "storytelling" techniques,47 Professor Baker has provided no concrete evidence that her account of Romer is representative of the 1995 Term or
of Supreme Court decisionmaking generally. Such a shame, too, for
we had such high hopes of infusing some empiricism and mathematical rigor into a field already replete with anecdote.48
At its worst, Professor Baker's criticism epitomizes the unfortunate reflex of established scientists to reject novel approaches to their
subjects of study.49 We could, of course, take solace in one of Max
Planck's constants: "scientists never change their minds, but eventually they die."' 50 We need not await a paradigmatic shift in positive
political theory, however, for Professor Baker has not described the
normal science of cooperative game theory, much less defended it.
She apparently overlooks one of game theory's essential tasks, that of
assigning values to players based on their contribution to various
groups. The conundrum of Supreme Court voting, like virtually every
other voting game, has an empty core and therefore lacks an obvious
solution. 51 The Shapley value was designed to provide a solution to
this sort of game. 52 No less than traditional game theorists, we have
offered a "theoretical attempt[ ] to predict the future in the face of
incomplete information. '53 We freely admit that we reject a single
element of conventional game theory, the assumption that the voting
institution in question is capable of assembling every theoretically
possible coalition of voters. We thus go where few traditional cooperative game theorists have gone before. Novelty in pursuit of knowledge is no vice, and certainly no basis for criticizing our enterprise.
47. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of Schook An Essay
on Legal Narratives,45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (criticizing the use of narrative techniques in
legal scholarship); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cardsof Dimitri Yurasov:
FurtherReflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647 (1994) (same); Anne M.
Coughlin, Regulatingthe Selfi AutobiographicalPerformancesin Outsider Scholarship,81 VA. L.
REV. 1229 (1995) (same).

48. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 65-66.
49.

See generally THoMAs S. KuHN, THm SmRucruRE OF ScIENTIFic REVOLUTIONS 77-91

(2d ed. 1970).
50. FREDERICK GRINNELT, THm Scmrrlc ATrI=tDE 49 (2d ed. 1992) (attributing this
saying to Max Planck).
51. See generallyJOHN VON NEUMANN & OsKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND

EcoNOwIac BEHAVIOR (1944); John von Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele (On the
Theory of Games of Strategy), 100 MATmrTIsCHm ANNALEN 295 (1928), reprinted in 4 CONTRIBUIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES 13 (1959) (R.D. Luce & A.W. Tucker eds., 1959).
52. See generally Tam SrrLEY VAL E: EssAYs IN HONOR OF LLOYD S. SHAPLEY (Alvin

E. Roth ed., 1988).
53. Baker, supra note 1, at 199 (emphasis omitted).
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III. RIPOSTE
A. Ti

MEDIAN

Is NOT THE

MESSAGE

Reduced to their bare essentials, all of Professor Baker's complaints stem from a single source. She seeks something that our model
does not directly measure. Her quest, but not ours, is one for the
Supreme Court's median Justice. "Who is the Court's 'most powerful'
or median Justice?" she explicitly asks.54 She assumes throughout her
article that the median Justice is the Court's swing Justice. In a moment of epiphany, she even unites the two concepts: "'[F]or any order'5
ing of the justices, the one ranked fifth is the pivot.' Case closed.
Here Professor Baker delivers the thrust of cooperative game
theory, and we shall stand firm in foiling her. It is by no means clear
that the median Justice and the Most Dangerous Justice are the same.
We thus come to the most interesting point of disagreement between
us and Professor Baker. We are ultimately concerned with each Justice's ability to deliver a "swing" vote, not with a Justice's distance
from the Court's ideological core over a range of issues. In short, the
median is not the message.
One passage exposes with particular clarity the depth of Professor Baker's allegiance to the median voter theorem. She champions
the "critical fact that the Justice who stands at the 'margin' of two
56
groups of her colleagues necessarily stands at the Court's center.1
There is but one possible interpretation of this assertion. Professor
Baker envisions the Justices' preferences in a single dimension. She
imagines that the Justices are arrayed along a line like so many real
numbers and that a vote divides them into two groups. 57 In this most
simplistic of circumstances, the median Justice is the most powerful
Justice. If we add but an iota of greater sophistication, however, Professor Baker's linear model would prove untrue.
Far from being a foregone conclusion, the median voter theorem
is hotly contested among positive political theorists. The numerous
empirical attempts to test the theorem have yielded very mixed results.5" Others have launched theoretical attacks on the theorem.59
54. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
55. It. at 200 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 201 (emphasis in original).
57. See DAVID BERUNSKI, A TOUR OF ThE CALCULUS 42-43 (1995) (using a line-cutting

metaphor to describe German mathematician Richard Dedekind's analysis of continuity and
irrational numbers).
58. See DENNis C. MUELLER, PuBIC CHoiCE II, at 189-93 (1989).
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Unfortunately, Professor Baker is silent on these matters. Although
we will spare the reader many of the technical details (and in so doing
spare ourselves an unwanted burden), we will recall what the classic
median voter theorem actually says. We follow the presentation of
Dennis Mueller. 60 The two key assumptions of the median voter theorem are that
(1) Issues are defined along a single dimensional vector x, and
(2) Each voter's preferences are single-peaked in that one
dimension.
Under these hypotheses we conclude:
The Median Voter Theorem. If x is a single-dimensional issue, and
all voters have single-peaked preferences defined over x, the xm (the
median position) cannot lose under majority rule.
These two hypotheses impose severe constraints on the median
voter theorem. Before applying the theorem to the Supreme Court,
one must ensure that both of these conditions hold. We believe that
neither does. It verges on the unsporting to name a multidimensional
Supreme Court controversy. We need not torture the reader with excruciating, paragraph by paragraph parsing of opinions such as Denver
61
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.
Consider instead Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia.62 A majority of five condemned what it perceived as viewpoint discrimination in a public university's refusal to fund a religious
student publication.6 3 A minority of four countered that the refusal
was justified by the university's compelling interest in obeying the
Constitution's establishment clause. 64 On that assumption the dissenters then rejected the Court's free speech analysis.6 5 Did Rosenberger
turn on a free speech axis, an establishment clause axis, or a single axis
59. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA & HowARD ROSENTHAL, PAR-nSAN POLrrcs, DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT AND Tm ECONOMY (1995); Daniel Ingberman & John Vdlani, An Institutional
Theory of Divided Government and Party Polarization,37 AM. J. POL Sci. 429 (1993).
60. See MuELLER, supra note 58, at 65-66. We confine our discussion to the one-dimensional variant of the median voter theorem. There are results for higher dimensions, but they
are more complicated and less conclusive. Although the hypotheses under which they apply are
more technical, many of the constraints that limit the theorem in our situation are applicable to
the higher-dimension variants of the theorem. See icL at 73-74.
61. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
62. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). The obviousness of this choice is suggested by the fact that the
mathematician among us, and not the law professor, was the one who picked the case.
63. See id. at 2516-25 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.).
64. See id. at 2533-47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
65. See id. at 2547-51.
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fusing the two constitutional considerations? Can any educated observer of the Court draw any firm conclusions? Like most of the
Court's cases, Rosenberger required the Justices to identify issues
along multiple dimensions and to balance their jurisprudential and
political preferences along several axes. To apply the median voter
theorem under such conditions is, to say the least, somewhat
troublesome.
The second prerequisite for applying the median voter theorem
to Supreme Court decisionmaking is even more elusive. To assume
that each Justice's preferences are single-peaked in a single dimension, as Professor Baker implicitly does, is effectively to ignore a
mountain of legal scholarship contesting this very premise.6 So many
issues, so many preferences, so few votes. The positive political theory that defines Supreme Court decisionmaking is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, 67 not the single-peaked coherence theorems of Black
and Sen.6 8 "The hope that" the Supreme Court might follow the ele-

mentary rules of public choice theory "is a part of a system of childish
illusions that dominates elementary [political science]; it is here,
when" the intractable complexity of game theory "is grasped, that like
first love elementary [political science] passes into memory. "69

66. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizingthe Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1982); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL.L. REV. 1 (1993); Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater:A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels,80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992); John M. Rogers, "I Vote
This Way Because I Am Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 Ky. L.J. 439
(1990-91); John M. Rogers, "Issue Voting" by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response to
Some RadicalProposals,49 VAND. L. REv. 997 (1996); Maxwell L. Steams, How Outcome Voting Promotes PrincipledIssue Identification:A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1045 (1996); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice,
103 YALE LJ.1219 (1994); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest:Justiciabilityand
Social Choice, 83 CA1. L. REv. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice:
HistoricalEvidence, 144 U. PA. L. Rxv. 309 (1995); cf.Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of
the Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. REv. 281, 302-06 (1994) (showing how Justice Scalia alone managed to reveal multipeaked preferences over time on a single issue-the legal viability of prospective adjudication).
67. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON.
328 (1950).
68. See DuNcAN BLAcK,THEORY OF COMMrTtEES AND ELECIONS (1958); Amartya K.
Sen, A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions, 34 ECONOMETRICA 491 (1966).
69. BERLINSmi, supra note 57, at 239.
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B.

MEDITATIONS ON A MODIFIED MEDIAN

Ah, but what romance lurks in the hearts of men? Let no one
accuse us of unregenerate realism. From the shadows of our reply, we
are willing to indulge Professor Baker's arguably quixotic supposition
that the median voter theorem applies to the Supreme Court. True,
we do not happily abandon the project of identifying feasible five- and
four-Justice coalitions, for each Justice's marginal ability to pose a
credible threat of defection is a significant component of Supreme
Court voting power. We will nevertheless consider a power index
based solely on the median Justice.
We do dispute one aspect of Professor Baker's methodology. In
building her own "Standard Measure" of the Justices' voting power,
Professor Baker "simply... count[s] the number of times each Justice
was a member of a winning coalition of any size." 70 Though blessed
with simplicity, this approach suffers from two flaws, one minor and
one major. The minor flaw flows from Professor Baker's decision to
count submajority decisions. On the Court, four is the loneliest
number; for the most part, we are uninterested in coalitions that lack
the strength to control legal reasoning. There is a simple fix, of
course: ignore all coalitions smaller than five.
The major flaw in Professor Baker's methodology lends itself to
an equally easy fix. By counting multiple instances of each coalition,
Professor Baker reinforces what we call the "docket bias" inherent in
each Term's decisions. As we noted in The Most Dangerous Justice,
each Term's docket takes on the flavor of certain leading cases. 7 1 The
prevalence of a particular strain of cases-say, federalism disputeswill tilt the balance of power on the Court toward the Justice or Justices who hold pivotal positions on the dominant issue.
Though inevitable, docket bias need not be fortified. A single
Term's docket is already a limited cross-selection of the vastly more
diverse workload that confronts the Court over a period of years.
Counting repeated instances of a particular 5-4 division on the Court
boosts the power ratings of the Justices who command that majority,
70.

Baker, supra note 1, at 202 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 192 ("[l]n order to

answer the question of who the [median] most powerful Justice was during a particular past
Term of the Court, game theory suggests that one must simply count up the number of times that

each Justice was a member of the winning coalition.").
71.

See Edelman & Chen, supra note 2, at 97.
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but it provides no additional information about the Court's deep coalitional structure. The only information relevant to this query is the
number of different winning coalitions.
We will therefore count the number of different winning coalitions-defined as coalitions of five or more-that each Justice joined
in October Term 1994, October Term 1995, and the two Terms
counted together. Our "median Justice" ratings follow:
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TABLE 3.1: MEDIAN JUSTICE POWER RATINGS, 1994 TERM[
Justice

5

6

7

8

9

Total

Index

Quotient

CJ

7

9

3

5

1

25

12.3

110

JPS

7

6

3

4

1

21

10.3

93

SOC

5

7

3

4

1

20

9.8

88

AS

4

8

3

4

1

20

9.8

88

AMK

9

10

3

5

1

28

13.7

126

DHS

6

9

3

5

1

24

11.8

106

CT

4

5

2

4

1

16

7.8

71

RBG

8

10

4

4

1

27

13.2

119

SGB

5

8

4

5

1

23

11.3

101

TABLE 3.2: MEDIAN JUSTICE POWER RATINGS, 1995 TERM
Justice

5

6

7

8

9

Total

Index

Quotient

CJ

3

5

7

3

1

19

10.3

93

JPS

4

5

5

2

1

17

9.2

83

SOC

6

4

9

3

1

23

12.5

113

AS

4

5

6

2

1

18

9.8

88

AMK

5

7

8

3

1

24

13.0

117

DHS

6

7

8

3

1

25

13.6

122

CT

3

4

6

2

1

16

8.7

78

RBG

5

6

8

3

1

23

12.5

113

SGB

4

5

6

3

1

19

10.3

93

236
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TABLE 3.3: MEDIAN JUSTICE POWER RATINGS, 1994 AND
1995 TERMS

Justice

5

6

7

8

9

Total

Index

Quotient

C

9

11

9

5

1

35

11.8

106

JPS

8

9

6

4

1

28

9.5

85

SOC

8

9

10

4

1

32

10.8

97

AS

6

12

8

4

1

31

10.4

94

AMK

11

13

9

5

1

39

13.2

119

DHS

9

12

9

5

1

36

12.2

109

CT

6

8

8

4

1

27

9.1

82

RBG

10

12

10

4

1

37

12.5

113

SGB

7

10

8

5

1

31

10.5

94

The most striking visual difference between our median Justice
power ratings and Professor Baker's "standard measure" is the
numerical shift from 9-0 decisions toward nonunanimous decisions.
Professor Baker's tables counted each of the 26 unanimous decisions
in the 1994 Term and each of the 37 unanimous decisions in the 1995
Term. By contrast, we credited each Justice with exactly one "point"
for his or her participation in the single grand coalition of all Justices.
In practical terms, little harm flows from Professor Baker's overcount
of 9-0 decisions; every Justice receives an equal amount of credit. In
her index and ours alike, the key lies instead in an effective
assessment of the nonunanimous decisions. Our measure stresses the
divided decisions that are likelier to generate a greater number of
different coalitions and thereby to disclose differences in voting power
among the Justices.
Modified to minimize docket bias and to highlight each Justice's
range in building different coalitions, the median Justice measure
comes reasonably close to our basic power indexes. The top four
finishers in our combined power pageant for the 1994 and 1995
Terms-Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Souter and Chief Justice
Rehnquist-score power quotients above 100 in a measure designed
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to identify the median Justice. All of these Justices also fare
reasonably well in Professor Baker's "standard measure."
The chief outliers are Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg. Justice
Ginsburg tops our principal power index and places second in our
median Justice index, but finishes a mediocre fifth in Professor
Baker's standard measure. Conversely, Justice O'Connor ranks
second in Professor Baker's eyes, but votes below par power in our
median Justice index and finishes in a dismal tie for seventh with
Justice Scalia in our most sophisticated power index. The probable
explanation lies in the unspoken difference between Professor Baker's
objective and ours. By crediting Justice O'Connor with each case
decided by coalitions to which she belonged, Professor Baker
implicitly accepts the premise that the strength of a coalition may be
directly measured by the number of decisions it renders. We, on the
other hand, emphasize the number of unique coalitions that a Justice
has joined, adhering to the belief that range in coalition-building is the
best measure of a Justice's voting power. The number of decisions
rendered is a function of the Supreme Court's fickle docket.
One final observation on the median Justice measure bears
notice. Justice Kennedy was the consistent winner of the median
Justice measure; he finished first in the 1994 Term, a very close second
in the 1995 Term, and first overall during the two Terms combined.
There is no reason, however, to believe that Justice Kennedy is the
Court's median Justice, that he sits on the Court's ideological
midpoint. That distinction probably belongs to a more ideologically
moderate colleague. Consider the following arrangement of Justices
by ideology-an admittedly subjective but eminently defensible array
moving from most liberal on the left to most conservative on the
right-paired with their scores in the median Justice derby:
JPS
8

SGB
(7)

DHS
3

RBG
2

SOC
5

AMK
1

CJ
4

AS
(6)

CT
9

(Note that Justices Scalia and Breyer actually tied for sixth. We have
assigned Justice Scalia to sixth place and Justice Breyer to seventh for
our own manipulative purposes.)
This arrangement not only achieves an elegant symmetry; it also
suggests something about the distribution of power in an ideologically
divided voting body. If in fact the Justices can be arranged along a
single ideological axis, and if the particular arrangement we have
chosen is accurate, the evidence from the 1994 and 1995 Terms allows
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us to form certain hypotheses about the relationship between ideology
and voting power. The ideologically median Justice is not the one
who appears in the highest number of different coalitions. Rather,
Justice O'Connor, who is the consensus pick for the Court's
ideological center of gravity, is poised at the midpoint of the Court's
power, not its apex. The true power voters flank her on the
immediate right and left, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg respectively.
Voting power then fans out in a progressively declining fashion as one
moves toward the ideological fringes, skipping over the median power
position that is held by the Court's consummate centrist. Although
further speculation would be premature, one of us has made
theoretical observations on power in an ideologically divided voting
body that are consistent with this empirical evidence regarding the
Court's median Justice.7 2
This application of the median voter theorem to the Supreme
Court vividly demonstrates the power of our methodology for
identifying the Most Dangerous Justice. There is no way to determine
whether Supreme Court controversies can be analyzed along a single
ideological dimension, much less whether the Justices' preferences
along that dimension are single-peaked. We therefore lack the factual
bases for concluding that the median voter theorem governs the
Court. On the other hand, we can rank the Justices not only by voting
power, but also by their ideological distance from the median. The
existence of these explicit and independent measures allow us to test
directly the validity of the median voter theorem.
We stand firm in our resolve to infuse mathematical rigor into the
study of Supreme Court voting. Let our critics inveigh and the law's
beguilers inveigle as they will; their cries are uttered in vain. We will
heed instead the symphony73 of beckoning sounds and thoughts that
springs from "elaborate mathematics." 74

72. See generally Paul H. Edelman, A Note on Voting, MATH. Soc. Sci. (forthcoming 1997).
73. Hear Diana Ross & The Supremes, I Hear a Symphony (BMI 1964), on 16 #1 Hrrs
FROM Tfm EARLY 60's (Motown 1987); hearalso Dire Straits, Sultans of Swing, on Dima STRAnTs
(Phonogram Ltd. 1978) ("[N]ot too many horns can make that sound"). See generally Jim Chen,
Rock 'n' Roll Law School, 12 CoNsr.COMMENTARY 315 (1995).
74. But cf. Baker, supra note 1, at 4.

